Biden’s nasty outreach to China
President Biden has largely overseen the continuation of his predecessor’s Chinese policy for the first 100 days, but has restructured the US strategy as a cooperating competition, setting it apart from its predecessor’s more confrontational approach. doing. At first glance, the difference is not clear. Like the Trump administration, Biden’s team called its commitment to Taiwan “solid” and restricted contact with Taipei diplomats in the face of widespread support in the face of Beijing’s increasingly aggressive military pressure campaign. I released it. The Biden administration also accused the persecution of Uighurs as a crime against genocide and humanity, doubling US support for Hong Kong’s democratic movement. Domestically, it hosted a virtual summit to maintain the key restrictions of the Trump era on Chinese tech companies and expand the scope of the Indo-Pacific democratic quad group. The main difference is the trajectory of the president’s strategy. Much of what he has accomplished so far is encouraging. But it is also the minimum required by the current political consensus on China. If the government’s efforts to work with Beijing on climate issues are any sign, even the current harsh stance on the CCP’s breach could later be eased. Other than explicitly condemning the Chinese Communist Party’s direct attacks on democracy, international order and human rights, it falls short of what is needed to address this challenge. So what should the Biden administration say about China? Authorities need to emulate the rhetoric of their predecessor. Trump officials described the party as “a Marxist-Leninist regime that exercises power over long-suffering Chinese people through brainwashing and brute force attacks,” they said. It will make you bold about what you do. ” -In the distant future. “Biden and his advisers enthusiastically talked about Beijing’s ambitions to rob democracy around the world, but they still discussed the threat more delicately. The president’s joint speech to Parliament on Wednesday First, his emphasis on “diplomatic policy for the middle class” spotlights some of the key initiatives his administration has supported in other ways. It masked the need to shine a light. He uses his address to fully fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and pass two major legislative packages currently passing Congress: a package that enhances its competitiveness with the US CCP. I was able to reflect the previous call. Instead, he called for competition with China to justify the agenda of domestic policy. “I believe the investment I proposed tonight will also advance foreign policy that benefits the middle class,” he said of his $ 1 trillion American family plan. Then, Biden, with reference to the discussion of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping General Secretary, explained how his administration is working How to Sino-US competition. He discussed the importance of standing up for human rights, but did not mention Hong Kong’s sick democratic movement or the Uighur massacre. He promised “a strong military presence in the Indo-Pacific,” but could not use that moment specifically to warn the party about its design in Taiwan. All in all, this speech summarizes Biden’s approach to China so far. It’s better than the year before Trump before America awakened to the threat, but it’s still not enough to move the ball forward. Meanwhile, despite the Biden administration’s own perception that China has committed massive atrocities since its inauguration and is preparing for an attack on Taiwan, the government has linked competition to bids for cooperation with the Chinese administration. Said that it can. Already, US Climate Envoy John Kerry has met his Chinese counterpart in Shanghai. The conference came with a joint statement pledged some modest commitments to funding the clean energy transition in developing countries. There are two issues with the government approach. China is interested in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions in the long run, but there is no reason to believe it will be reduced at the rate determined by negotiations with Washington. To make matters worse, Chinese authorities are subject to participation in future agreements on US policy towards Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated the party’s position at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations last week, saying, “If the United States does not interfere with China’s internal affairs, we can get smoother cooperation on climate change.” It was. Kelly argues that it does not allow these other issues to be “hostaged” by the climate, but nevertheless considers negotiations essential. But already, these negotiations have shaped the way he talks about Sino-US relations. He said nothing about human rights in Shanghai. “These differences don’t have to prevent as important as dealing with climate,” he said in an interview with foreign policy this week, although there are differences between the two countries. He added that the conversation in Shanghai was tough, but they were able to find some things in common. “And I think it opens the door or window to other possibilities in those other areas.” Its future progress remains unlikely. By 2020, China accounted for three-quarters of the new coal-fired power plants commissioned worldwide. And when Kelly proved that the Chinese Communist Party was in fact eager to deepen its authoritarianism domestically and pursue revenge policies abroad, it proved that Beijing would make progress “in other areas”. Falsely assume that it is in the interest of. The bright spot in all of this is the administration’s focus on working with US allies to strengthen Washington’s ability to respond to the malicious actions of the Chinese Communist Party. The Trump administration relied on the US alliance more than most people knew, but its diplomacy was often overshadowed by President Trump’s rhetoric. High-ranking government officials made the mistake of hosting a US-China summit, which gave CCP diplomats a platform to lie about Beijing’s human rights abuses and America’s role in the world. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been sent to Japan and South Korea. Despite the German government’s reconciliation of Beijing for commercial gain, the Biden administration’s early efforts on Europe also appear to have paved the way for greater transatlantic unification with China. Blinken’s first international trip to Brussels was the venue for the announcement of a large-scale, collaborative campaign, with the EU, UK and Canada joining the United States to announce sanctions against Chinese officials involved in the Uighur massacre. .. In itself, it makes sense to bring together such international efforts. Even better, it led Beijing to impose its own sanctions on European researchers, activists, and politicians. Previously, the EU-China trade agreement, the Comprehensive Investment Agreement, which only provides verbal services to human rights issues, could well be approved by the European Parliament, despite US opposition. The Communist Party’s generous response seems to have dimmed those outlooks somewhat. However, building alliances is only one tool in the administration’s arsenal, and by itself it cannot mitigate the vulnerabilities opened by the administration’s early efforts to CCP. He enacted to address the challenge in the first 100 days, unless the president turned back the pesky efforts to seek cooperation with the party, and unless he explained in uncertain terms the threat to human freedom. There is a risk of undermining some promising policies.